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Shelley's Mont Blanc is indisputably one of the key poems of his overall oeuvre. No 
matter what line of interpretation they prefer, all critics are agreed that it holds a strategic 
position for the characterization of Shelley's poetological, ideological and philosophical 
profile in his middle years, and as the exact nature of this middle phase is itself highly 
controversial, Mont Blanc can be seen as a text whose interpretation vitally affects the 
assessment of Shelley's entire career. 
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Mont Blanc, "the most difficult of Shelley's 
shorter poems", "has received more diverse interpretations than any other".2 The stakes are 
high. There is, it is true, a certain consensus that Mont Blanc, just like Wordsworth's 
"Tintem Abbey", is a highly complex philosophical poem, which takes a specific topography 
only as a starting point for an extended discussion of the relationships between mind and 
world, consciousness and matter, subject and object - a philosophical deliberation poetically 
dramatized. But it is far from being settled what the actual outcome of Shelley's exertions is. 
For a while, the Platonists held Mont Blanc, declaring it proved Shelley to be a genuine 
idealist. These forces of yesteryear have long withdrawn into distant valleys and their 
rearguard fighting hardly impinges upon the current critical debate any more. Others have 
read Mont Blanc in a materialist vein, arguing that it shows a godless universe governed by 
Necessity. Others again have held that Shelley evidently couldn't quite make up his mind and 
that the poem is therefore full of tension and downright contradictions. Today the ruling 
orthodoxy undoubtedly is that Shelley was a sceptic, although that designation seems to have 
become an ultra-liberal umbrella term, sheltering all sorts of philosophical positions, from the 
idealist scepticism of Berkeley to the empiricist scepticism of Hume, from the special brand 
1 The term is used in its threefold Hegelian sense of a) to raise, b) to preserve, c) to cancel. 
2 Kenneth Neill Cameron, Shelley: The Golden Years, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1974, 
244. 
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of William Drummond to the contention that Shelley was so sceptical that he had hardly any 
convictions of his own, but spent his life - a deconstructionist avant la lettre - exploding 
those of others. 
It may seem presumptuous to claim that after all this something new - and possibly 
something new and of importance - can be said about Mont Blanc. But I should nevertheless 
like to suggest a new reading, one that re-defines the philosophical core of the poem by 
differentiating between its implied ontology and its epistemology and then proceeds to show 
how the two are poetically linked. 
Mont Blanc was written in late July, 1816, when Shelley, Mary Godwin and Claire 
Clairmont visited the valley of Chamonix. It was the same trip on which Shelley described 
himself as "Democrat, Philanthropist, and Atheist", "destination l'enfer" in possibly three 
hotel registers or visitors' books. As we know from his diary letters to Peacock, Shelley was 
overwhelmed by the alpine scenery and especially by the sight of the Mont Blanc massif. His 
poem takes its origin from this overpowering experience and is at the same time an attempt 
to create in language the equivalent of its occasion, as Shelley himself explained in his 
preface to the first edition of Mont Blanc in 1817: 
It was composed under the immediate impression of the deep and powerful 
feelings excited by the objects which it attempts to describe; and, as an 
indisciplined overflowing of the soul, rests its claim to approbation on an 
attempt to imitate the untameable wildness and inaccessible solemnity from 
which those feelings sprang.3 
The verbal echoes of Wordsworth's "Preface to the Lyrical Ballads" are quite distinct, 
but so are the differences: Whereas Wordsworth defines poetry as "the spontaneous overflow 
of powerful feelings" and adds significantly, "it takes its origin from emotion recollected in 
tranquillity", it seems that Shelley intended a direct, as it were, iconic presentation of those 
"powerful feelings", without the mitigating filter of a "recollection in tranquillity". And this 
might explain why Mont Blanc begins with such enormous power and thrust, with a 
momentum that carries its periods over the line endings like a mountain stream in schuss: 
Quoted from M.H. Abrams et al. (eds.), The Norton Anthology of English Literature, Fifth 
Edition, 2 vols., New York/London: Norton, 1986, vol. 2, 685. 
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I The everlasting universe of things 
Flows through the mind, and rolls its rapid waves, 
Now dark - now glittering - now reflecting gloom -
Now lending splendour, where from secret springs 
The source of human thought its tribute brings 
Of waters, - with a sound but half its own. 
Such as a feeble brook will oft assume 
In the wild woods, among the mountains lone, 
Where waterfalls around it leap forever, 
Where woods and winds contend, and a vast river 
II over its rocks ceaselessly bursts and raves.4 
As William Keach has brilliantly analyzed Mont Blanc's highly complex rhyme scheme 
and metrics5, I can confine myself to remarking that in this first stanza - which is surprising-
ly abstract after the topographical title - Shelley makes a clear, unequivocal philosophical 
statement on the relation of mind and the world of objects: The human mind is flown 
through by the never-ceasing stream of the world of objects and delivers but a moderate 
contribution of its own, a contribution whose share is often overestimated, as Shelley makes 
clear by a simple analogy in lines 7ff.: "the universe of things" and "human thoughts" stand 
in the same relation to each other as "vast river" and "feeble brook" do. This has the clarity 
of a mathematical equation: 
universe of things vast river 
human thought feeble brook 
In the second stanza, Shelley underlines this view of things by adding another, extended 
analogy: "thus thou" signals unmistakably that he regards the deep ravine of the river Arve as 
yet another concrete illustration of the relationship defined in stanza 1. The ravine - all 
passive - is run through by a river that is the symbol of an active power ("Power in likeness 
of the Arve comes down" [16]). The ravine is an entirely passive receptacle, or rather duct, 
All Shelley texts are quoted from Shelley's Poetry and Prose, eds. Donald H. Reiman and 
Sharon B. Powers, New York/London: Norton, 1977. 
Cf. William Keach, Shelley's Style, New York/London: Methuen, 1984. 
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even what it gives back is only the echo of a perpetual dynamics that has its source elsewhere: 
30 Thy caverns echoing to the Arve's commotion, 
A loud, lone sound no other sound can tame; 
Thou art pervaded with that ceaseless motion, 
Thou art the path of that unresting sound -
34 Dizzy Ravine! 
For those who still cannot see how the roles are distributed, where Shelley puts activity 
and where passivity, the following lines should be an eye-opener, because he describes the 
relationship of subject and object as a continuously dialectical one, but one in which the 
object pole is clearly dominant: 
34 and when I gaze on thee 
I seem as in a trance sublime and strange 
To muse on my own separate phantasy, 
My own, my human mind, which passively 
Now renders and receives fast influencings, 
Holding an unremitting interchange 
40 With the clear universe of things around; (34-40) 
If one compares this to the opposite passage in Wordsworth's "Tintem Abbey", which 
also renders the relation between mind and world as a dialectical one, the difference is 
immediately evident: "I am still", we read in Wordsworth's poem, 
103 A lover of the meadows and the woods, 
And mountains; and of all that we behold 
From this green earth; of all the mighty world 
Of eye, and ear, - both what they half create, 
107 And what perceive;6 
In Wordsworth, consciousness projects the world and is actively involved in die 
constitution of reality, whereas here in Mont Blanc the "unremitting interchange" has an 
obvious tilt towards the object pole. The backflow which consciousness returns is only 
6 Also quoted from the Norton Anthology of English Literature, vol. 2. 
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seemingly active, even its supposed giving is, strictly speaking, anything but - note: "which 
passively / Now renders and receives". Consciousness is embedded in a total continuity, 
which can hardly be called dialectical any more because it doesn't allow autonomy. 
Consciousness is absorbed in this continuity, in which subject and object are fused on the 
terms of the latter. This conception will be maintained till the end of Mont Blanc. Even the 
following passage - indeed one of the most difficult and controversial ones of the poem -
which is full of ambiguous grammatical references and equivocal metaphors and deals with 
the question how, under these circumstances, something like creativity can take place at all, 
does not significantly modify Shelley's model. 
Instead, he now turns in stanzas 3 and 4 to the origin of that enormous power, the 
unmoved mover or primum mobile behind the perpetual cycle of existence and decay (see 
lines 84-95), in his imagery: Mont Blanc. But majestic as its summit rises ("Still, snowy, and 
serene"), the scenery below is one of utter devastation and destruction. Superhuman forces 
have here formed a landscape that is harsh, hostile and repulsive: 
62 Its subject mountains their unearthly forms 
Pile around it, ice and rock; broad vales between 
Of frozen floods, unfathomable deeps, 
Blue as the overhanging heaven, that spread 
And wind among the accumulated steeps; 
A desart peopled by the storms alone, 
Save when the eagle brings some hunter's bone, 
And the wolf tracts her there - how hideously 
Its shapes are heaped around! rude, bare, and high, 
Ghastly, and scarred, and riven. - Is this the scene 
Where the old Earthquake-daemon taught her young 
Ruin? Were these their toys? or did a sea 
74 Of fire, envelope once this silent snow? 
This is the likeness of a nature that in its very greatness and material power is absolutely 
indifferent to humanity, heedless of its existence. Nature - and therein lies its terror - stands 
for the inconceivable, the Other, the non-human that breaks into man's life: 
290 
100 The glaciers creep 
Like snakes that watch their prey, from their far fountains, 
Slow rolling on; there, many a precipice, 
Frost and the Sun in scorn of mortal power 
Have piled: dome, pyramid, and pinnacle, 
A city of death, distinct with many a tower 
And wall impregnable of beaming ice. 
Yet not a city, but a flood of ruin 
Is there, that from the boundaries of the sky 
Rolls its perpetual stream; vast pines are strewing 
Its destined path, or in the mangled soil 
Branchless and shattered stand: the rocks, drawn down 
From yon remotest waste, have overthrown 
The limits of the dead and living world, 
Never to be reclaimed. The dwelling-place 
Of insects, beasts, and birds, becomes its spoil; 
Their food and their retreat for ever gone, 
So much of life and joy is lost. The race 
Of man, flies far in dread; his work and dwelling 
Vanish, like smoke before the tempest's stream, 
120 And their place is not known. 
Shelley presents a view of nature, of creation, in which man holds no privileged status 
but is brutally and helplessly exposed to the rage of its elements. Overawed, he recognizes its 
superior strength, thrown as he is into a world that was not built for him but to which he has 
to accommodate. That the majestic river can work beneficently in distant countries (124) 
only supports the idea that this power is to be conceived of as essentially indifferent, that is, 
it does not exist with regard to humanity, it is not concerned with it. This is the lesson of the 
sublime and awful scene: 
96 Power dwells apart in its tranquillity 
Remote, serene, and inaccessible: 
And this, the naked countenance of earth, 
On which I gaze, even these primeval mountains 
100 Teach the adverting mind. 
This universe cannot be conceived of as being anthropocentric, and the only consolation 
it holds is an indirect one: Compared to the dimensions and time periods of geology and the 
cosmos, the injustices and cruelties of political tyranny and despotism vanish like nothing. A 
recurrent topos in Shelley's political thinking - well known from Queen Mab, "Ozymandias" 
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and Prometheus Unbound, to say nothing of his prose writings - is thusntroduced at he end 
of stanza 3: The very proportions of nature expose social orders ad formations as but 
passing, inessential deviations - paradoxically, it is through its non-hman dimensios that 
material nature opens up the revolutionary perspective that we are stillin the pre-hi:ory of 
mankind - history proper has not yet begun: 
76 The wilderness has a mysterious tongue 
Which teaches awful doubt, or faith so mild, 
So solemn, so serene, that man may be 
But for such faith with nature reconciled; 
Thou hast a voice, great Mountain, to repeal 
Large codes of fraud and woe; not understood 
By all, but which the wise, and great, and good 
83 Interpret, or make felt, or deeply feel. 
When I said above that Shelley's conception or model of the relatin between mid and 
the world of things would be maintained till the end of the poem, tilt was, I coress, a 
deliberately ambiguous phrasing. For although the determination oi human thouht by 
outside forces is emphasized yet again in lines 139-141 -
139 The secret strength of things 
Which governs thought, and to the infinite dome 
141 Of heaven is as a law, inhabits thee! -, 
there is, in the last three lines of Mont Blanc, a totally unexpected, inredible and tilliant 
reversal: 
142 And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea, 
If to the human mind's imaginings 
144 Silence and solitude were vacancy? 
That is the decisive point: The human mind alone invests the wor) with meani^ and 
significance. Mind may be a part of nature, subject to its laws - but natre is only mening-
ful, it is Nature writ large, because there is a consciousness for whh even silenc and 
solitude are not vacancy, not emptiness and nothing. Human consciousdss does not reate 
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the flow of the "everlasting universe of things" - quite the contrary, it is based upon it -, but 
it structures it and invests it with meaning and significance. It is in the human mind that the 
world becomes conscious of itself. And if you are looking for an example of this essentially 
human ability to "see things as", to find meaning even in dead matter and understand Stille 
as Schweigen - well, Shelley's Mont Blanc is a wonderful specimen: it illustrates its own 
thesis, it practices what it preaches. 
It remains to discuss whether Shelley understood this great continuum, in which subject 
and object are fused, in which the former is conditioned by the latter, but the latter named 
and interpreted by the former, in an idealist sense as a spiritual one or in a more empirical 
sense as a material one - or whether he transcended this alternative in Mont Blanc. And it is, 
I should like to suggest, the notion of the sublime that helps to elucidate Shelley's highly 
original position in this question, because it is, as I should like to show, in the concept and in 
the experience of the sublime that Shelley finds a paradigmatic and genuinely aesthetic 
solution for a philosophical antinomy that had haunted him for quite a while. 
The concept of the sublime which derives from the rhetorical treatise Peri Hypsous of 
Pseudo-Longinus of the first century after Christ, is - it is trivial to observe - of an immense 
importance to eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century discussions of art and literature 
in Britain. The first translation of Peri Hypsous into English dates back to 1652, but it was 
only the translation of Boileau's somewhat idiosyncratic rendering of the tract ( 1674) that 
spread its influence decisively. Now the interesting thing about the eighteenth-century 
sublime in Britain is that the originally rhetorical term - it designates a textual quality that 
points to the greatness of the soul of its author - is first stretched in the opposite direction - it 
comes, after Boileau, to mean the treatment of a theme and its effect on the reader, the 
feeling it evokes - and then, finally, applied to a set of feelings which are aroused by nothing 
literary at all, viz. by the grandeur and majesty of nature as it is manifested in the sea, the 
sky or high mountains. This shift in meaning - for which the names of Thomas Burnet, John 
Dennis, Joseph Addison (all of whom did know the thing but did not use the term for it) and 
of Edmund Burke may stand -is, curiously enough, a British and German phenomenon, the 
French retain the rhetorical meaning, so that Laurence Sterne could write in his Sentimental 
Journey in 1768: 
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I confess I do hate all cold conceptions, as I do the puny ideas which engender 
them; and am generally so struck with the great works of nature, that for my 
own part, if I could help it, I never would make a comparison less than a 
mountain at least. All that can be said against the French sublime in this 
instance of it, is this - that the grandeur is more in the word; and less in the 
thing.7 
This shift towards the natural sublime and the concomitant emphasis on the subject's 
reaction to nature's objects culminates towards the end of the century in Immanuel Kant's 
analysis of the sublime in his third critique, The Critique of Judgement (1790). 
Now Shelley's Mont Blanc gives us in an almost classical manner an image of the 
natural sublime as both quality of an object and subjective experience at the same time. The 
alpine landscape, the feeling of being overpowered and a strange feeling of fusion or unity 
with the surroundings are commonplaces of the discourse on the sublime. The second - the 
feeling of being overpowered - can help to answer the question of Shelley's ontology, the 
third - feeling of union or fusion - will clarify Shelley's epistemology. 
First, in how far does Shelley's depiction of the overpowering experience of Mont Blanc 
and its glaciers give us a clue as to whether he saw "the great continuum" as a material or 
spiritual one? It is a topos of the discourse of the sublime in the eighteenth century to regard 
the overpowering experience of nature's immensity as a proof of the existence of God and 
the fundamentally spiritual nature of reality. Samuel Taylor Coleridge's "Hymn before 
Sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni", published in the Morning Post and Poetical Register in 
1802 and reprinted in The Friend in 1809, is a textbook example of this: The natural 
landscape proves God, he is the author behind the work. "Who would be," thus Coleridge on 
the message of his poem, "who would be, who could be an Atheist in this valley of 
wonders!"8 Well, he obviously could not foresee the possibility of a P.B. Shelley. For 
especially when seen in contrast with "Hymn before Sunrise", it is evident how demonstra-
tively Mont Blanc is written against a firmly established literary, philosophical and religious 
tradition, how determinedly it denies - confronting the same scenery ! - any transcendental 
7 Laurence Sterne, A Sentimental Journey & Journal to Eliza, New York: Signet, 1964, 58. 
8 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Poetical Works, ed. Emest Hartley Coleridge, Oxford: OUP, 1973, 
377. 
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transfiguration of the horror. Whereas Coleridge's "Hymn" - partly plagiarized from 
Friederike Bruns "Chamounix beym Sonnenaufgange" (May 1 79 1), not even written in the 
vale of Chamonix and disparagingly qualified by William Wordsworth as "a specimen of the 
mock sublime"9 - whereas this hymn praises God, Mont Blanc is a document of the over-
powering experience of a material force threatening bodily annihilation. Just as the human 
mind is confronted with something that surpasses its capacities ("the very spirit fails"), so 
man as a physical being is threatened to be annihilated by "Nature as Might" (Kant) and he 
realizes his utter impotence in view of these material forces when he sees that "to offer some 
resistance to [them] [...] would be quite futile".10 This second aspect of the sublime - called 
the dynamically sublime by Kant in contrast to the mathematically sublime - seems to me to 
be foregrounded to such a degree in stanzas 3 and 4 of Mont Blanc that the impression it 
gives is one of unalloyed materiality. Here, Shelley's sublime is, in an admittedly ambiguous 
passage in Keats, "a material sublime".11 In its evocation of terror in view of an indifferent, 
godless universe, to which man as a physical being is only peripheral and accidental, Mont 
Blanc - especially when seen against the backdrop of the tradition it breaks - is a mani-
festation of an ontological and matter-of-fact materialism. 
But things look different in regard to epistemology, and it is, as I indicated, the concept 
and the experience of the sublime that allows Shelley to bridge the apparent philosophical 
hiatus. The third commonplace of the sublime mentioned above is the peculiar experience of 
unity, the fusion of subject and object. For the Romantics, the sublime is a relational 
phenomenon, that is, it is neither to be located exclusively as a quality inherent in the object 
nor exclusively as a psychological effect in the beholder. William Wordsworth makes this 
very explicit in his fragment "The Sublime and the Beautiful" (1810/11), a text which was 
probably intended to form part of what was to become A Guide Through the District of the 
See Stuart Curran, Poetic Form and British Romanticism, New York: OUP, 1986, 60. 
Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, transi, by James Creed Meredith, Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1992, 110. 
The poem is "To J.H. Reynolds, Esq.". For a discussion see Louise Smith, "The Material 
Sublime: Keats and Isabella", Keats: The Narrative Poems - A Casebook, ed. John Spencer 
Hill, London: Macmillan, 1983, 105-118. 
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Lakes (1835), because it treats, again, of the experience of the sublime in a mountainous 
region. Wordsworth says 
[that] [t]o talk of an object as being sublime or beautiful in itself, without 
reference to some subject by whom that sublimity or beauty is perceived, is 
absurd; [...]. The true province of the philosopher is not to grope about in the 
external world and, when he has perceived or detected in an object such or 
such a quality or power, to set himself to the task of persuading the world that 
such is a sublime or beautiful object, but to look into his own mind and 
determine the law by which he is affected.12 
But this affection of the mind results from "the notion or image of intense unity, with 
which the Soul is occupied or possessed".13 Again it was Kant who explained much better 
than Wordsworth could how a feeling of failure (the failure to grasp that which is "great 
beyond all comparison") is finally transformed in the two-phase experience of the mathemati-
cally sublime to its very opposite, a feeling of sublime grandeur. But the Kant-Shelley-
connection will be pursued in a larger study. Here, it must suffice to say that in this state, 
subject and object are fused, melt into each other in such a way that it makes little sense to 
differentiate between external object and internal experience, because both coincide and the 
real experience of the sublime constitutes the sublime. 
But this makes the experience of the sublime paradigmatic of an idealist epistemology, 
because it shows - albeit through a borderline experience - that all we perceive and know is 
only given as a presence in our consciousness, as a state of our own mind. 
Was that Shelley's position at the time? Without any doubt. The brilliant closing lines of 
Mont Blanc - which can be compared with phase 2 of Kant's sublime - say nothing but that 
it is human consciousness that projects the world according to its categories, actively 
structures the flow of sense impressions, and, most important of all, transcends the world 
William Wordsworth, The Prose Works of William Wordsworth, eds. WJ.B. Owen and Jane 
Worthington Smyser, 3 vols., Oxford: Clarendon, 1974, vol. 2, 357. 
Wordsworth, Prose, 355. 
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thus experienced by giving it human significance.14 Already the "witch of Poesy" passage, 
here only mentioned in passing, in which the finding of the right image for the ravine of the 
Arve is greeted with an emphatic "Thou art there!", can be understood as an instance of 
philosophical idealism. 
But there is also external evidence, in Shelley's essay On Life (today dated December 
1819), which has to be adduced because it has often been cited to present Mont Blanc (with 
which it is often coupled) and Shelley as being idealist through and through. It is true that in 
On Life Shelley writes "nothing exists but as it is perceived" and he distances himself from 
his youthful materialism, "This materialism is a seducing system to young and superficial 
minds. It allows its disciples to talk, and dispenses them from thinking."15 When he con-
tinues, "Each is at once the centre and the circumference, the point to which all things are 
referred, and the line in which all things are contained", this reads like a prose paraphrase of 
Mont Blanc's last three lines. In his epistemologica! idealism he cancels, as was to be 
expected, the demarcation line between object and idea when he reiterates, "Nothing exists 
but as it is perceived", and then continues, "The difference is merely nominal between those 
two classes of thought, which are vulgarly distinguished by the names of ideas and of 
external objects."16 And in an ultimate intensification he seems for a moment to become an 
absolute idealist, when he says: 
In the larger study mentioned above - Christoph Bode, "And what were thou...": Essay über 
Shelley und das Erhabene, Essen: Blaue Eule, 1992 - it will be shown that Shelley's "the 
human mind's imaginings" and Kant's "unbestimmte Vernunftideen" are functionally 
equivalent and that their conceptions of the sublime are much closer than has hitherto been 
supposed. 
Shelley's Poetry and Prose, 476. 
Shelley's Poetry and Prose, 477. 
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Pursuing the same thread of reasoning, the existence of distinct individual 
minds, similar to that which is employed in now questioning its own nature, is 
likewise found to be a delusion. The words /, you, they, are not signs of any 
actual difference subsisting between the assemblage of thoughts thus indicated, 
but are merely marks employed to denote the different modifications of the one 
mind. [...J I am but a portion of i t 1 7 
What a field day for those who would like to pocket Shelley as an unadulterated idealist! 
Is it possible to imagine a more definite statement of one's philosophical idealism? But 
doesn't that mean that my thesis of Shelley the ontological materialist is obsolete? Not at all. 
For On Life is not yet at an end, and just as Shelley puts an idealistic epistemology on top of 
his materialist ontology at the very end of Mont Blanc, he bases, at the end of On Life, his 
idealism on a full-grown materialism. Essay and poem are inverse twin texts: 
[...] that the basis of all things cannot be, as the popular philosophy alleges, 
mind, is sufficiently evident. Mind, as far as we have any experience of its 
properties, and beyond this experience how vain is argument, cannot create, it 
can only perceive. It is said also to be the Cause? [sic] [...] [But] [i]t is 
infinitely improbable that the cause of mind, that is, of existence, is similar to 
mind.18 
That is the last sentence of On Life. Or rather, it was, until Donald Reiman and Sharon 
Powers in their edition of the essay introduced the following which had formerly been taken 
to be a part of Shelley's Speculations on Metaphysics - it reads: "It is said that mind 
produces motion and it might as well have been said that motion produces mind." But this 
only underlines the message, because it reminds of d'Holbach's witty remark, aimed at 
Descartes, in the Système de la Nature (which Shelley knew) that rather than say there is 
something separate from matter which can think it would have been more consistent to 
conclude that matter can think. A cutting application of Ockham 's razor. Mind is highly 
organized matter in motion - Shelley continued to believe this, as can be seen from another 
essay of his, On a Future State. 
17 Shelley's Poetry and Prose, 477-8. 
18 Shelley's Poetry and Prose, 478. 
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Shelley's universe is a material one, which does not exist for man but confronts him 
indifferently. This realization overwhelms him and would leave him helpless if it were not 
for the insight that such knowledge and such self-knowledge is possible only in his mind, this 
new quality of the universe, and that there alone the world exists as a meaningful one. In 
Mont Blanc - and this will go on for years - Shelley is an ontologica! materialist and an 
epistemologica! idealist at the same time. 
Isn't that philosophically dubious? Maybe so. But Shelley was -whatever he thought 
about himself and in spite of his stupendous reading and never-waning interest - no syste-
matical philosopher. As a poet, it was enough for him to have reconciled (or aufgehoben) the 
philosophical contradictions of his position in a genuinely aesthetic category: the sublime. 
And that he really saw them reconciled is borne out by a simple, unassuming little word 
at the beginning of the third line from the end of Mont Blanc, a word whose placement is 
evidence of Shelley's incredible poetic genius, it is the word "and" - which here, quite unlike 
the expected "but", signals the poetic Aufhebung of a philosophical antinomy. It is, by the 
way, the same "and" that we find in the last sentence of On Life. Shelley's materialism and 
his idealism are reconciled, their opposition is transcended, in the aesthetic concept and in the 
experience of the sublime. 
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